We estimate whether migration can be an equilibrating force in the labour market by comparing pre-and post-crisis migration movements at the regional level in both Europe and the United States, and their association with asymmetric labour market shocks. Based on fixed-effects regressions using regional panel data, we find that Europe's migratory response to unemployment shocks was almost identical to that recorded in the United
Introduction
With the large and growing unemployment disparities in Europe in the wake of the global economic crisis (also termed the 'Great Recession'), the question of whether or not free labour mobility can be an equilibrating force on the labour market is a highly topical one. In the EU-27, the average unemployment rate rose between 2008 and 2013 from 7.5% to 10.9%, before falling back to 8.7% in 2016. However, not all countries were equally affected. Whereas the unemployment rate rose in Greece and Spain by 16 and 8 percentage points, respectively, between 2008 and 2016, it actually declined in Germany, by more than 3 percentage points. In the United States, the labour market impact of the crisis across states has also been far from even, although the variation has been less marked than in Europe.
This paper looks at the response of migration to differing labour market conditions, by analysing preand post-crisis migration movements in both Europe and the United States and how they have been linked to asymmetric economic shocks. Unlike most previous literature on this topic, we focus explicitly on the distinction between the pre-and post-crisis periods, and use region-fixed-effects regressions in a comparative study using two types of regional classifications for both free-mobility citizens' migration and total migration for both Europe and the United States. We also update our previous work (Jauer et al., 2014) by using data up to 2016, when unemployment rates had already decreased for 3 and 6 consecutive years from their crisis peaks in Europe and the United States, respectively. Consistent with Arpaia et al. (2016) , Beyer and Smets (2015) and our previous results, we find that the migratory response to unemployment shocks increased with the crisis in Europe such as to almost catch up with the response observed for the United States. Still, a large share of population growth differences between regions in the Eurozone has been accounted for by inflows of citizens from outside of the Eurozone. Many of these migrants have been citizens from new EU member states (Arpaia et al., 2016; Kahanec and Pytliková, 2016; Kahanec and Guzi, 2016; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2016) .
As Kahanec and Zimmermann (2016) point out, the first decade of the 21 st century was characterized by a 'double experiment of both EU enlargement … as well as the Great Recession' in Europe. Although regional mobility used to be low in the central European countries before EU accession (Bornhorst and Commander, 2006; Fidrmuc, 2004; Huber, 2007) , east-west migration in the free mobility area in Europe accelerated with the EU enlargements in 2004 (Kahanec, Pytliková, and Zimmermann, 2016 .
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According to the OECD standardised migration statistics, the share of free movement inflows in total permanent inflows to those EU countries for which the OECD publishes standardised statistics rose from 43% on average over the period 2007-2010 to 52% on average over the period 2011 -2015 (OECD, 2017 .
OECD data also show that migration of the free-mobility type is the component in international migration flows that has reacted most strongly to the crisis.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing empirical literature on the role of migration as a labour market adjustment mechanism. Section 3 presents the data used for the analysis as well as some descriptive information on recent trends in regional labour market disparities in Europe and the United States. Section 4 outlines the empirical approach used in the paper. Section 5 analyses the links between labour market disparities and migration responses, distinguishing between the pre-and post-crisis periods. Section 6 concludes.
The literature on migration as an adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks
With the introduction of the euro as the common currency, a higher degree of factor mobility, especially labour mobility, is required as an adjustment mechanism in the face of economic shocks if the Eurozone is to function effectively as an optimal currency area (Mundell, 1961) . It is thus an important empirical question whether labour mobility acted as an adjustment mechanism in Europe, especially after experiencing a large negative shock during the crisis. It is particularly interesting to compare the responsiveness of labour mobility to labour market shocks in Europe with the one observed for the United States.
Nevertheless, mobility is not a sufficient condition for regional convergence after asymmetric shocks.
Indeed, the New Economic Geography literature stresses spillover effects of human capital investments leading to agglomeration economies such that migration from less to better performing regions might exacerbate rather than counter regional divergence (Epifani and Gancia, 2005, and Francis, 2009 (Gallin, 2004; Kennan and Walker, 2011) .
Data and regional disparities
The datasets used in this paper cover the EU-27/EFTA, the Eurozone, and the United States at two the Eurozone) and the United States. The sample has been restricted to the working-age population (i.e., persons aged 15/16-64) 6 .
Data for the EU-27/EFTA and the Eurozone are taken from the European Labour Force Survey (LFS).
The regional classification used for the EU-27/EFTA and Eurozone countries is the Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS). The survey data used for the estimations are aggregated on both the basic regional (NUTS-2) and major regional (NUTS-1) levels. The number of observed NUTS-2 regions in the EU-27/EFTA and Eurozone estimations is 263 and 168, respectively, with an average of about 1.3 million working-age inhabitants per region for each of the two areas under consideration. For the estimations on the NUTS-1 level, 98 regions for the EU-27/EFTA and 61 for the Eurozone are included, each with an average of about 3.5 million working-age inhabitants. Because we received the European Labour Force Survey as a data extract in the form of cell data, we took data on unemployment and non-employment as well as GDP per capita (used as a proxy for regional income per capita in the regressions) from the Eurostat Regional
Database. In order to obtain a time-consistent regional coding, some NUTS2 regions for some countries had to be combined, such as for Switzerland, for which data are only included at the national level. With an average working-age population of about 0.9 million people, these time-consistent 'SuperPUMA' regions are somewhat smaller than the NUTS-2 regions in Europe with about 1.3 million working-age inhabitants. The equivalent to the NUTS-1 level is the state level in the United States, with an average working-age population of about 4 million, which is very similar in size to Europe's NUTS-1 regions. For the United States, we merge GDP per capita (obtained from the OECD Regional Database) as a proxy for regional income at the state level to both the state and 'SuperPUMA' regional data sets.
The unemployment rates are defined as the number of unemployed divided by the labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15/16-64 years old), using the standard ILO definition for unemployment. 9 The non-employment rates are defined as the share of those not employed among the total working-age population. States than in Europe, where it was more protracted. While unemployment has fallen continuously in the United States since 2010, it continued to grow in Europe until 2013, after which it also started to decline. A further observation is that unemployment had declined quite significantly in Europe in the years just prior to the crisis, whereas the decline was only marginal in the United States. A measure of the interregional disparity in unemployment rates is given by the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rates, which is about twice as large in Europe than in the United States (Figure 2 ).
There is also much more cyclical variation in this measure in Europe, where a decline is observed until the beginning of the crisis (EU-27/EFTA) and an increase since 2009, which accelerated after 2010 until 2012, whereas no such changes are observed in the United States. One also observes a somewhat stronger increase in the unemployment variation in the Eurozone compared with the whole EU-27/EFTA at both NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 levels. However, after 2012/13, unemployment rates in the Eurozone started to converge whereas they continued to diverge for EU-27/EFTA. 
Empirical approach
In the following, we measure shocks by increases in the regional un-/non-employment rate relative to the respective rate of the economic area of interest. 10 The unemployment rate is the standard indicator for labour market shocks. Many labour economists, however, like to supplement it with the non-employment (or employment) rate in order to get a more accurate picture of the state of the labour market (Cadena and Kovak, 2013) . In the following, we will therefore use both indicators to measure the state of the labour market and the economy in general. Similar to a study by Puhani (2001) on labour mobility as a potential adjustment mechanism for economic shocks in Europe, we will investigate the statistical relationship between population changes in a region (both total population changes and changes induced by population changes of nationals within the free-mobility area) and the regional unemployment (non-employment) rate relative to the overall unemployment (non-employment) rate in the free-mobility area. Likewise, we include regional GDP/income per capita relative to the overall GDP/income per capita in the free-mobility area as a proxy for relative wages. 11 As pointed out by Harris and Todaro (1970) , migration is determined by the expected wage, which is a positive function of the wage and a negative function of the unemployment (or non-employment) rate.
Our model is based on the concept of the population growth factor generated by net migration in a region being "produced" by its un-/non-employment rate and income per capita relative to the unemployment rate and income per capita in the whole economic area (here the EU-27/EFTA, the Eurozone, or the United States). 12 Hence, we set up the following production-function-like model:
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It would be preferable to include a measure of relative real wages but unfortunately such data are not available at the regional level.
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By using relative measures, we assume that the decision to migrate or not is affected by the labour market situation in a given region relative to that elsewhere in the free-mobility area.
where mig indicates net migration and pop the population level. .
Because our data do not allow us to observe net migration directly, we proxy the migration-induced population growth factor by the actual population growth factor as it is observed in the data. Hence,
The following regressions are estimated separately for two dependent variables. In a first set of regressions, the total population change in a region is the dependent variable. It is henceforth called the 'population growth factor' and is defined as
, where pop is the working-age population in region i.
In a second set of regressions, the dependent variable is approximately the percentage change of the population that is induced by inter-regional movements of nationals of the free-mobility zone, hereafter referred to as the 'free-mobility-induced population growth factor'. It is defined as
Dfmp characterises the change (proxy for net migration) in the working-age population accounted for by nationals of countries in the free-mobility area, that is "-− "-=> .
Thus, the simulated free-mobility-zone-migration-induced population change is the hypothetical population growth factor that would have been observed had the population only varied due to the changes in the number of free-mobility-zone migrants in that region. Ideally, we would like to measure migrationinduced population change in all our regressions, but instead, the data only allow us to measure the total population change. This means, for example, that we also capture the effect of population ageing in our dependent variable -if more people pass our upper age limit of 64 than our lower age limit of 15/16, this shows up as a negative population change (i.e. a population growth factor smaller than one) -even if no migration is taking place. Although we would much prefer to have data on interregional migration flows directly, this measurement error need not be a problem for our analysis: any measurement error that is constant over our estimation period in any given region (such as steady population ageing) will not bias our estimates, because the region fixed effects will control for these time-constant measurement errors in the population change. To the extent that all regions in the free-mobility zone also experience a common trend in population ageing or any other measurement error, this measurement error will be controlled for by the fixed time (year) effects in our regressions. Even time-varying measurement error that is specific to certain regions will not bias our coefficient of interest as long as this measurement error is not correlated with either the relative unemployment or non-employment rate.
Combining expressions (1) and (2) 
where lf stands for 'labour force'. In the first set of regressions, we simulate how many persons migrate in year t for each additional person unemployed in year t-1. 13 By restricting the measurement of population change to migration of nationals from within the area under consideration in the second set of regressions, we can also isolate the size of the contribution of this particular group to the migratory response to regional unemployment dispersion and compare the intra-free mobility of the EU-27/EFTA area with interregional migration in the United States.
Analysis
We estimate regressions at two different regional levels in the free-mobility areas under consideration (EU-27/EFTA, Eurozone and the United States). Both OLS and fixed effects (FE) regressions are estimated.
The FE estimates control for time-constant unobserved factors, such as time-constant measurement errors or time-constant differences in amenities (climate, infrastructure) that are unobserved but have an impact on 13 We also ran separate regressions for the youth population aged 15/16-24 (available upon request). The results indicate, not surprisingly, that this group tends to be more responsive to changes in the relative regional labour market conditions than the overall working-age population.
net migration into a region. Whereas the OLS estimator uses all the variation in the data (within and between regions), the FE estimator only uses the variation in the dependent and impact variables over time in each region, that is the so-called 'within' variation in the data. More than that, the coefficients on relative unemployment or non-employment rates are of similar size across regions (EU-27/EFTA, Eurozone, and United States) for any given regional coding (that is smaller or larger regions). The FE estimated coefficient of -0.012 for the Eurozone at NUTS-2 over the full period can be interpreted as follows: if the number of unemployed persons in the previous year increases by 1% ceteris paribus, the population growth rate in that region decreases by 0.012%.
In order to interpret the above coefficients correctly, we have to take into account that unemployed people are usually only a small fraction of the population. Therefore, in the Annex Tables we interpret the estimation coefficients at the sample means. For example, the average number of unemployed people in a Eurozone NUTS-2 region in our sample over the whole period is 91,707 people. A 1% increase in this number corresponds to 917 people. Thus, if unemployment in the previous year increased by 917 people, the population would decrease by 0.012%. How large is that number? The average population size for a Eurozone NUTS-2 region in our sample is 1,279,976 people, 0.012% of which are 157 people. Thus, 917 additional unemployed in a region in year t-1 decreases the population in the region in year t by 157 people according to our FE estimates. This means that at a maximum 17% of the unemployment increase may be offset by a population change/out-migration. This is non-negligible and higher than previous estimates, such as those reported by Puhani (2001) which suggest a migration offset of 4% and 8% over the period for Italy and France, respectively. 14 Note, however, that these estimates provide upper bounds for the impact, since not all migration movements will be of unemployed people, and not all of those who move will take up employment elsewhere. Table 2 disaggregates the results into the pre-and post-crisis periods, for the FE specification which is our preferred one. All estimated coefficients are negative, both for the unemployment and the nonemployment measure, and most are statistically significant. The income per capita variable tends to be insignificant and sometimes changes sign depending on which of the two periods is the basis for the estimation. Here, it is interesting to observe that during the period after the start of the financial crisis 2009/10-2016, our point estimates for the two European areas are mostly much larger than for the period 2006-2008/09, whereas the reverse is the case in the United States in three out of four cases. Indeed, the estimates suggest that the pre-crisis labour mobility reaction to asymmetric labour market shocks was stronger in the United States than in Europe, in line with previous results in the literature. However, this pattern has disappeared with the crisis, with estimates sometimes being larger in Europe and sometimes in the United States, depending on the specification. We find, for example at the NUTS-2 level in the EU-27/EFTA, that in the period 2010-2016 at most 19% of the increase in unemployment was adjusted for by a population change, whereas the potential adjustment was only 16% and non-significant in the pre-crisis period (see the simulations in Table A1 ). For the estimates using relative non-employment as the impact variable, the simulation results are 18% during the crisis and an insignificant 5% in the pre-crisis period (Table A2 ). For the United States at the SuperPUMA level, the simulated upper bounds are 21% versus 87% post-and pre-crisis for unemployment shocks and 13% versus 27% post-and pre-crisis for non-employment shocks, respectively.
Tables 1 and 2 about here
Up to now, we have looked at the association between labour market disparities and all migrationinduced population changes. Of particular interest is the population change that is generated by nationals within the free-mobility zone, as nationals of third countries from outside the respective region do not 14 These estimates refer to the period 1985 to 1996. For Western Germany, Puhani (2001) reported an estimated offset of up to 30%; however, this period covered German reunification which was associated with largescale movements from East to West Germany.
necessarily enjoy the same mobility rights.
15 Tables 3 and 4 present the OLS and FE results under this alternative specification, for the full period in the former table, and the FE results disaggregated between the pre-and post-crisis periods in the latter. In general, and not surprisingly, restricting the sample to nationals from within the free-mobility zone tends to weaken the association somewhat. This holds more in Europe than in the United States, particularly in the Eurozone, where per-capita migration flows from nationals outside of the free-mobility zone are much higher than in the United States (see OECD, 2017) . 16 Despite a weaker association between regional population changes and labour market shocks for nationals, all coefficients in the fixed effects regressions in Table 3 remain negative when restricting population changes in the dependent variable to those induced by nationals only. When looking at mobility caused by citizens before and after the crisis (Table 4) , this type of mobility increases for the EU-27/EFTA area, but results are not consistent for the United States, where mobility seems to have decreased at the SuperPUMA level, and they are also not consistent for the Eurozone, where an increase in mobility is observed only at the NUTS-1 but not at the NUTS-2 level. The upper bounds of the simulated adjustments due to migration in Tables A1   and A2 are similar for EU-27/EFTA and the United States in the post-crisis period, but mostly lower or statistically insignificant for the Eurozone.
Taking these different sets of estimates for the Eurozone and the EU-27/EFTA together, especially when comparing Tables 2 and 4 , we conclude that labour market adjustment in Europe during the crisis was driven primarily by citizens from outside the Eurozone, such as the recent EU accession countries or non-EU-27/EFTA countries. Tables 3 and 4 about here 
Conclusion
This paper aimed at analysing the migration response to asymmetric labour market conditions in the pre-and post-crisis periods in Europe and the United States. We find that prior to the crisis, the migration response to labour market shocks was much stronger in the United States, in line with previous results in the 15 However, it is possible that part of the measured effect arises from naturalisations, i.e. immigrants with a non-EU-27/EFTA nationality taking up citizenship of their respective host countries -and this is a group that is particularly mobile.
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Cadena and Kovak (2013) still demonstrate that Mexican migrants played a significant role in the absorption of labour market shocks in the United States during the crisis.
literature. This picture appears to have changed with the crisis and the evidence suggests that migration in Europe has reacted more strongly to changes in labour market conditions since the Great Recession whereas the opposite appears to be the case in the United States. Thus, the size of the gap in terms of the labour market adjustment due to migration between Europe and the United States narrowed significantly between the pre-and post-crisis periods irrespective of which regional classification is used.
The increase in labour mobility in Europe is linked to the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 which greatly increased the scope of free labour mobility within the EU/EFTA and the Eurozone. By doing so, it added to the adjustment capacity of the labour markets to cope with asymmetric shocks. It is also conceivable that there may be threshold effects at work (e.g., through fixed costs like language differences), implying that intra-European mobility has grown disproportionately only once labour market disparities have reached a certain level. Indeed, these disparities have widened more strongly with the crisis in Europe than in the United States and were, in terms of unemployment at the larger regional level, more than twice as large in
Europe as in the United States.
With regard to the important issue of whether migration has functioned effectively in recent years as a labour market adjustment mechanism for the Eurozone in the face of asymmetric shocks, it is too early to pass a definitive judgement based on our results. More time and data would be needed to test this hypothesis.
But we can conclude that migration has served to increase labour market adjustment within the Eurozone in recent years. Our findings suggest that within the Eurozone, adjustment due to labour migration occurred only to some extent from citizens within the Eurozone, and to a larger extent from other countries' citizens such as recent EU accession countries or non-EU-27/EFTA countries. Raising the contribution of Eurozone citizens to labour market adjustment within the Eurozone requires a continued move towards freer movement of labour within Europe.
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